WP050191

PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICES IN PUBLIC
EDUCATIO N: AN INVESTIGA TION OF
TRUSTEE EFFECTS

by

Robert McCormick
Cora Moore
Bruce Yandle
Department of Economics
Clemson University

PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICES IN PUBLIC EDUCATION:
AN INVESTIGATION OF TRUSTEE EFFECTS 1

ROBERT MCCORMICK,

CORA MOORE,

and

BRUCE YANDLE

Department of Economics
Clemson University

Education is one of the most important roles of government, yet its management and organization
have received surprisingly Lillie auention in the economics literature. In this paper we study the
impact of various organization structures on the quality of education. We develop a model of the
demandfor private schooling which, by inference, allows us lo assess the quality ofpublic education.
We estimate the parameters of the model using 30 years of data across the 46 counties in South
Carolina. Among other things, we find that counties with multiple districts seem lo have belier
schools, counties with elected rather than appointed trustees have higher quality schools, the
structural changes mandated by the 1984 Education Improvement Act have made for belier schools,
but like others working before us, we could uncover no relation between expenditures and the quality
of education. Structure mailers more than money is the lesson of this research project.

I. Introduction
In recent years, economists who apply relatively new management theories to the study
of organizations have begun to focus on public 'education (foma (1983) and McCormick and
Meiners (1988) for examples). In the past, massive amounts of research examined such things
as the education tax burden, the benefits and costs of public education, and important related
questions having to do with the formation of and return to investments in human capital. By and
large, the education firm was viewed as a non-thinking black box, an unchanging feature of
nature that simply reacted and responded to citizen action. Little thought was given to who was
in the box, their objectives, constraints, and incentives, what we term the management structure
of the education firm.
In a way puzzling, the benign neglect of education managers by most managerial
economists may be just another example of the cobbler's barefoot children. The more remote
the object of research, the more attractive the topic appears to members of the academy. On the
other hand, economists recognize the scientific (and career) hazards encountered when studying
themselves and their own organizations. Yet the topic of incentive structures in higher education
caught the attention of Adam Smith, who had much to say, but little to recommend about the
education firm. 2
The importance of management to the measured success of high schools has been lifted
recently in work by Chubb (1988). Chubb examined a large data set of 500 high schools, 12,000
teachers, and 12,000 students, where the students had been given entering and exiting exams to
measure education gain. Searc~ing for determinants of academic achievement, Chubb found no

1

Along the way we have benefitted from able-bodied assistance in many forms . Notably, the comments of Jeff
French, Mike Maloney, and participants at the Political Economy Research Center's First Annual Political Economy
Forum, Bozeman, Montana, June 9-12, 1990 are gratefully acknowledged .

2

See Smith (1937) pages 716-719 .

CLEMSON UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Vcl'llion of March 6, 1991

2

correlation with expenditures per pupil, size of class, teacher salaries, homework assignments,
graduation requirements or any other school policy, the things that reformers seem to feel are
important. As Chubb put it, what really mattered was how the schools were organized.
Successful schools had principal/managers who consciously sought academic achievement for
their students and were allowed flexibility in accomplishing that end. The research findings we
will report suggest Chubb's successful managers did not emerge by happenstance. They were
hired and monitored by trustees who sought to maximize the asset values of the schools in their
jurisdictions.
The research we have undertaken is intended to expand our knowledge about the
management structure of educational units. The paper applies the concepts of the horizon
problem, agency costs, monitoring, and special interest incentives to trustee management of
public schools and higher education. A major part of our work relates directly to South
Carolina's 1984 Education Improvement Act (EIA), a major restructuring of educational
organization and spending in S.C., and we report a test of EIA effectiveness.
Two central questions form the heart of our paper: 1. Do different methods of selecting
school district trustees and trustee terms of office affect the apparent ability of public schools to
attract students when competing with private schools? 2 . Does increased spending on education
affect its quality?
The paper has three parts. The next part of the paper reviews managerial theories and
concepts that we apply in later empirical work. The second portion of the paper reports research
on public school performance in South Carolina, which tests the effectiveness of the EIA and
theories of trustee behavior. A short summary concludes the paper.

II. Theories of Trustee Behavior
Why Trustees?
According to Fama and Jensen (1983), trustees exist in nonprofit firms to initiate
decisions and monitor the behavior of managers in implementing those decisions. As the
principal monitoring agent in the firm, the trustees replace the function of capital markets in
private firms that, acting on behalf of collective asset owners monitor and discipline the behavior
of hired managers. In this important sense, the trustees represent citizens who hold an
inalienable stake in the assets of the education unit and are liable for the unit's debts but who
cannot monitor asset management at low cost.
In our view, the term of office and selection methods of trustees for taxpayer-supported
public schools and universities reflect necessary political contracts formed between important
interest groups and politicians who are constrained by a large mass of rationally ignorant voters.
Among the voters, those with children attending publicly supported schools are logically better
informed than those who are not directly connected to the educational process .
Differences in the terms of trustee contracts (the rules by which trustees are selected and
terminated) reflect different constraints and political necessity. But elements of the contract that
relate to terms of office and method of appointment will generate incentives that affect important
management behavior and the future asset value of the education firm.
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Trustee Incentive Problems
Among these incentive problems there is first the horizon problem. A contract calling
for longer trustee terms, with life trustees being the limiting case, is evidence that asset owners
have greater marginal influence in efforts to maximize the net asset value of institutions. Longer
terms provide the key management agent with the ability to consider and be recognized for
returns that have a larger long-term payoff. Since public sector managers have no future claim
on the excess of revenues over costs, they naturally tend to maximize the present value of
benefits (not necessarily asset values) they can claim while in a position of authority. The shorter
their time horizon, the more likely they will seek quick returns, foregoing profitable ventures
whose income streams emerge beyond the trustee's tenure. However, trustees are constrained
by the method of appointment when choosing among alternative decisions.
In a principal-agent sense, the trustee-agent must satisfy the appointing authority to
secure his position. If the trustee is appointed by politicians who in tum must satisfy their
principals (the voters), the trustee's investment horizon will correspond to the politician's office
horizon. That is, the trustee's actions will reflect the politician's need to distribute visible
benefits to his constituents. To the extent that voters are myopic, responding to immediate
payoffs, the politically appointed trustee will choose to engage in activities that generate highly
visible and quick returns.
The longer the trustee's term of office, the more likely the trustee will engage in
activities that generate a longer stream of higher valued benefits. At the limit, a life trustee, if
chosen because of past generous support to the education firm and therefore less accountable to
politicians, will manage the educational unit in ways that more nearly maximize the value of the
assets committed to trustee management.
If the trustee is elected by voters within the school district, an element of agency cost is
removed. That is, voters can monitor the trustees directly and act to continue or remove the
trustee, as opposed to monitoring the trustees and communicating with politicians who generally
represent areas larger than a school district. Trustees elected directly by parents in a school
district will behave differently from those elected by voters in larger jurisdictions with competing
interests, since directly involved voters will be better informed about the performance of their
schools.

Previous Research on Incentive Problems
Research on agency cost and the trustee problem reported by Toma addressed some of
these issues in the context of state boards of education that manage public schools and state
boards that manage universities (Toma 1983, 1986) . Toma hypothesized and found evidence that
appointed board members (trustees) of state public school systems were more likely to regulate
instead of manage principals than elected trustees. She also found that appointed trustees shared
apparent rents with public school teachers , allowing costs to be higher than in the case of elected
trustees. When she examined the length of appointment for board members, Toma found that
trustees with longer terms tended to extract more from citizens for themselves and their associates
than did short-term counterparts.
Toma's (1986) work on college boards examined two situations, one where trustees
manage a single college and another where a single board manages several colleges. Focusing
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on agency cost, Toma argued that faculty and administrators would have greater leeway to follow
their own directions where trustees have several schools to monitor. In the latter case, there is
a tendency for faculty salaries and performance to regress toward the mean. Put differently,
mediocrity reigns supreme. On the other hand, the single university board will run a tighter
ship, holding managers more accountable for their use of resources. In a follow-up study, Toma
(1990) examined differences in the state share of student tuition, patterns of faculty tenure, and
pupil teacher ratios for a sample of universities having differing management structures . Her
findings show that universities with individual boards of trustees behave more like private
universities, as compared with university systems that share one board.
We have noted that trustees with shorter terms must be sensitive to political pressures.
They are more likely acquiesce to faculty who desire to manage educational units, since public
controversy is to be avoided. However, an increase in faculty control of management decisions
is expected to be associated with a decline in academic achievement. Research by McCormick ·
and Meiners (1988) examined this issue for universities and considered the degree to which
faculties are authorized to influence some 31 management decisions often made by university
boards and administrators. Using measures of faculty and student research output and other
indicators of university quality, McCormick and Meiners found quality to be lower where faculty
management participation was higher.
Research on the role of trustees reported by Henry Manne (1973) reviewed the history
of universities and discussed the relationship between university trustees and faculty in terms of
a power struggle over educational priorities. Trustees gained their management positions either
by having made major contributions to universities or by being appointed by people who had
made such commitments. Manne saw the trustees as seeking to maximize the long-run value of
the educational product. He argued that educational units were given non-profit status to prevent
entrepreneurs with short investment horizons from altering the products desired by large
donor/investors. As the finance burden shifted from trustee/donors to taxpayers, the trustee came
under greater political influence, and the term of trustee appointments became shorter.

Summary
The theories of trustee behavior we have described and the research findings related to
them suggest we should observe significant differences in the quality of educational units in
association with different trustee structures. All else equal, measured academic achievement
(quality) should be higher the longer the term of the trustee. The horizon problem is mitigated.
The trustee appointment method should also affect the quality of the educational product.
Trustees responsible directly to citizens in their own community are predicted to be closer
monitors and managers of educational quality than those who must respond to politicians elected
by a larger group of citizens. Agency cost is reduced, and monitoring costs are lower. These
empirically refutable propositions form the basis for the next part of our paper where we examine
public schools across the 46 counties of South Carolina.

5

Vcnion of March 6, 1991

III. Trustees in S.C. Public/Private School Competition
The Effectiveness of EIA
South Carolina's Education Improvement Act of 1984 (EIA) dedicated $1.2 billion over
a five-year period for improving public education. Funded with a one cent or 25 % increase in
the state sales tax, the legislature appropriated $213 million of the new funds for the 1984-85
school year. Of this, $68 million was earmarked for additional teacher pay; $59 million for
remedial education; and $58 million for the construction of new buildings. With these increases
came funds for additional administrators to manage the EIA effort. The EIA was heralded as
bringing a better day for public education in the state. In addition to increased funding, the 1984
EIA also restructured public school education in South Carolina in a number of ways.
Regulations were imposed requiring students to pass at least four academic courses to be eligible
for participation in interscholastic activities such as football. The number of units required for
a high-school diploma was increased. All secondary schools were compelled to offer a clearly
defined college preparatory program. New and stricter attendance rules were put in place. The
instructional day for secondary students was required to be no less than six hours. Kindergartens
were made mandatory. All days missed for reasons of inclement weather were required to be
made up. All school districts were required to provide Advance Placement courses. An exit
exam was put in place for all high school students with passage required for the receipt of a
diploma. New, lower student-teacher ratios were mandated along with higher teacher salaries. A teacher incentive
program was instituted. New rules were created for the Table 1 Secondary School En~llment 'in
•
South Carolina
assessment o f prmcipals. Incentive grants were established
,----------------,
to recognize excellence in schools and school districts with
Year
Private
Public
Ratio
exceptional performance. All together, a number of
1956
8794
563244
.01537
fundamental changes were put in place.
Competition between private and public schools
within and across school districts in South Carolina
provides a natural experiment for examining the success of
EIA as perceived by the parents of children enrolling in
primary and secondary education and for testing the
independent effects of school district trustee terms and
appointment methods. If EIA improved public schools
relative to private ones, the ratio would become systemati
cally smaller in association with pupil expenditures, all
else equal.
South Carolina has 46 counties that control
secondary education in the state. Table 1 and Figure 1
report enrollment in private secondary schools as a fraction
of total enrollment from 1956 to ·1987. In 1987 there were
624,832 students enrolled in public schools in South
Carolina. An additional 45,778 were in private schools.
South Carolina schools began to seriously integrate in
1965, and forced busing for racial balance began in earnest
in 1972. The latter stands out prominently in the figure.

1957
1958
1959

1900

1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966

1967
1968
1969

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987

9637
10710
12371
14043
14094
13626
14149
14864
I 695 I
18686
21840
22311
24063
'2Dm
387:SO
43569
46814
47997
503 I 8
51511
53045
54128
54047
53669
51474
51184
51445
51219
5I 406
:SO l :SO
45778

575076
584283
782852
610101
621419
627443
639518
652006
652529
655163
655946
658243
657905
652848
639263
628780
614667
612361
608327
645389
605133
604741
640206
63m3
635187
626001
621497
617101
604978
604030
624832

.01648
.01800
.01555
.02249
.02217
.02125
,02164
.02228
.02531
.02m
.03222
.03278
.03528
.03831
.05715
.06480
.07077
.07268
.07639
.07391
.08059
.08215
.07784
.07762
.07496
.07558
.07644
.07664
.07831
.08320
.07326
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The single largest jump in private school
enrollment occurred in 1972. 3

6
Rati o Private/ Public
0.1

The research problem we faced was
0.08
the development of the statistical counterpart
to the natural experiment, which is to say
how to specify the determinants of the de
0.06
mand for private/public education.
We
encountered a major problem with data
0.04
collection and were necessarily forced to
resort to a course of action that is less than
perfect. We were unable to obtain any price
0 .02
data on tuition charges at private schools.
Thus our hypothesized demand equation is
misspecified. However, we were able to
0 .........
..........
..........~ ~ ~ ~ . . . , . . . . _ ~..........
.......
56
59
62
65
66
71
74
77
80
63
66
obtain what we consider reasonable proxies
Year
for costs of operation. It is our belief that
the remaining source of error is minimal, but Figure 1 Private School Enrollment in sc
the reader may take another view. In sum,
we hypothesize that the demand for private school enrollment is a function of the year, income,
population, the fraction of the population that is non-white, the number of school districts per
county, real expenditures per pupil in public schools, the population density of the county,
whether the public schools were integrated, whether there was forced busing, and the level of ,
education in the county.
~

~

~

Intuition suggests that higher incomes, larger population, and more education lead to
larger demand (and supply) for private education. 4 We expect these three variables to be
positively associated with the demand for private school enrollment. For a variety of reasons not
all tied directly to prejudice, the racial composition of the population may affect the demand for
private schooling. Under virtually all scenarios, a positive relation is expected between the
proportion of the population that is non-white and the demand for private school.
The population density of the county may affect the costs of operation. Counties with
larger areas/less population must transport kids farther to private schools (public school
transportation is free), raising the cost (and price) of private education, thereby reducing the
demand for private schooling.
The organizational structure of schooling is the primary focus of our study. Most
counties, 29, have a single school district, some 63 %; 11 % of the counties have two districts,
and another 11 % have three; the remaining 15% have four or more. This variable is included
in the model to adjust for the level of competition among public schools in each county. The
larger the number of competing school districts, the more likely public school quality would rise,

3

At the individual county level, the county with the smallest secondary-school student body had just 1740 total
students in 1985, the largest, 51,682 students. One county only had 63 private students in 1985. By contrast, the largest
private school enrollment was 8,738 pupils.
4

We measure the level of education in a county by the median number of years of schooling attained by the citizens
in the county.
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as parents can vote with their feet at relatively low cost within a county. If the competition
argument is correct then, counties with multiple public school districts will have better quality
schools, other things the same, than counties with a single, county-wide, monopoly-like, district,
and consequently the private school/public school ratio will be lower as the number of districts
increases.
Over the period of our analysis, two important legal changes have occurred that are likely
to affect the private/public school choice, especially where parents are sensitive to the issue of
racial integration. While Brown v. Board ofEducation (1954) was certainly the most important
Supreme Court case in school desegregation, two other events are almost as important. The Civil
Rights Act of 1964 coincided with the first instance ofpublic school integration in South Carolina
with the admission of Harvey Gant to Clemson University and signalled a new day in South
Carolina public schooling. Thus we include in our model a dummy variable bifurcating our
sample into the integrated period, post 1964, and the segregated period, prior to that year.
Secondly, in April 1971 the Supreme Court held in Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg
Board ofEducation that busing should be used to force desegregation where geographic patterns
did not yield that result. 5 This ruling was the culmination of more than 10 years of litigation
aimed at forcing (primarily) Southern states to fully and completely integrate public schools, not
to simply tokenly desegregate them. 6 To account for this radical change in the legal environ
ment, we created a second dummy variable taking the value one in the post 1971 period and zero
prior to that time. In our minds these two dummy variables capture two major legal changes that
took place over the period 1954 to the present. To further investigate legal and other changes
that we have not specifically identified, we also included time in the model.
Expenditures per pupil are included in the model to capture the effects, if any, that
spending has on education. According to many educators and politicians, increasing expenditures
improves education. If this argument is correct then some parents will withdraw their children
from private schools and enroll them in public schools as more money is spent in public schools.
By contrast, if higher expenditures are simply used to raise the salaries of existing teachers and
administrators, purchase toys or other capital equipment for the enjoyment of children which,
in the eyes oftheir parents do not improve the quality ofeducation, then, increasing expenditures
will not attract pupils away from the private school system. Thus, the expenditure variable
captures part of the effect of the 1984 EIA, the change in spending. To account for the change
in organizational and incentive structure mandated by the law, we also included a 0, 1 dummy
variable with value one in the post-1985 period. This one year lag allows for any effects to have
a chance to work.
We collected data on the relevant variables for the period 1956-1987 across the 46
counties in South Carolina to estimate the model parameters. 7 Table 2 reports parameter esti
mates of the model using 1187 time-series , cross-sectional observations. All the variables in the
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Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Board of Education 402 U.S. I (1971) .
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For a history of this legislation, see Green (1990) .

7

The data were obtained from various editions of the Sourh Carolina Statistical Abstracl and the Annual Report of
the Department of Education of the State of SC . We are missing income and expenditure data for several years over the
sample period. The income and expenditure variables were converted to real I 988 dollar terms using the CPI deflator.
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Table 2 Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Ratio of private school to public school enrollment

Ordinary Least Squares Estimation

Source

DF

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Square

Model
Error
Total

11
1175
1186

2 .24354
1.87551
4.11904

Root MSE
Dep. mean

0 .03835
0 .05373

F value

prob>F

0 .20396
0 .00147

138.654

0 .0001

R2
Adj R2

0.5447
0.5407

PARAMETER ESTIMATES

Variable
Intercept
Year (xlOOO)
Real Income per capita c,1000)
Population (xlOOO)
% of Population Non-White
Number of Districts
Population Density
1964 Integration
1971 Forced Busing
Median Years of Schooling
in the County Population
Real Expenditures per pupil <• 1000)
0,1 Dummy for 1984 EIA

t for H 0 :
Parameter=0

Parameter
Estimate

Standard
Error

-0 .201 273
0.060799
0.004006
0 .000400
0 .002159
-0 .002260
-0 .000178
0 .003374
0 .039042

0.02931158
0.49026
0.00084
0.00006
0.00010469
0.00066164
0.00004934
0 .00415346
0.00463728

-6 .867
-0 .124
4.751
6.500
20.628
-3 .415
-3.605
0 .812
8.419

0.0001
0.9013
0.0001
0 .0001
0.0001
0 .0007
0 .0003
0.4168
0 .0001

0 .009104
0.001654
-0 .010151

0.00177484
0.00133
0 .00526588

5.129
1.240
-1.928

0 .0001
0 .2153
0 .0541

prob> Iti

model are statistically significant except for the expenditure per pupil variable, the 1964
integration dummy, and the time trend. Although the time trend is away from private schooling,
it is not statistically significant. Richer counties have a greater demand for private education.
The population of the county and the proportion of the population that is non-white are both
positively associated with the private school ratio. The more districts in a county, the smaller
is the relative private school demand. Population density has the predicted negative effect on the
private school-public school ratio. The dummy variables representing integration and forced
busing are both positively associated with relative increases in the demand for private schooling.
This finding could be driven by racial prejudice, or fears that increasing federal intrusion into
the public schools would lower the quality of public education, or both. The more educated is
the population, the greater is the private school ratio.

•

The expenditure per pupil variable is one test of the effects of the Educational
Improvement Act, and the coefficient is not statistically different from zero, confirming the result
found by Chubb, no relation between expenditures and the quality of education. Indeed, the
coefficient is actually positive. However, the dummy variable fo r the Education Improvement
Act of 1984 is negative and significant at the 10% level. This is an interesting result. According
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to these estimates, the increased expenditures mandated by the EIA had little impact on the
quality of schooling, but the changes in incentives and organizational structure are associated
with better education .
We estimated additional models in attempts to examine the sensitivity of the original
results. First, we estimated an autoregressive model. We also estimated the original model
using weighted-least squares to correct for any heteroscedasticity that might exist in the errors.
Then we estimated a first-order autoregressive, time-series only model using the entire state as
the unit of observation. Finally, we estimated a generalized-least-squares model correcting for
heteroscedasticity and autoregressive errors. The original results do not change much. Most
importantly, in no case was the expenditure variable significant at the 10% level or better. Our
findings suggest that increasing expenditures has not improved the quality of secondary education
in SC.
These results raise a number of questions about the 1984 EIA . At least, these
preliminary findings suggest that the bulk of the increased spending on education in South
Carolina, as viewed through the eyes of parents of school age children, did not have an
appreciable impact on the quality of education. 8 However, at the same time, we find that the
structural changes mandated by the law, are associated with improved quality of education in the
state. Structure, incentives, and organization matter more than money, at least according to these
results.

Trustee Effects
In South Carolina, counties either have a Board of Education or a Board of Trustees.
In 39 of the 46 counties, these officials are elected but in the nine others, the governor appoints
the members. 9 These Boards also vary in size. Many (19) have seven members; fifteen others
have nine members, and the rest run the gamut from five to 16. To examine the impact of these
two forces on the quality of educational instruction, we included the two variables in our private
school-public school model. We incorporated a 0, 1 dummy variable taking the value one when
the county board of trustees are appointed by the governor of the state and zero when elected by
the citizens of the county. We also included a size variable which is simply the number of mem
bers on the county board of trustees. 10
We estimated this revised model by ordinary-least-squares . The coefficient estimates on
the original parameters are basically unchanged as are their levels of significance. Notably, the
impact of expenditures per pupil remains insignificant while the EIA dummy remains negative

8

There is an alternative explanation worthy of examination that we have not explored. Contemporaneous with the
increased expenditures and other changes wrought by the 1984 EIA, the private schools in South Carolina either lowered
their tuition rates or raised their quality to maintain their market position. That is , in the face of increased competition ,
the private schools made a simultaneous· adjustment in quality enhancement that makes it difficult to uncover the true
impact of the 1984 EIA. We plan to explore this notion in the future, when data availability make it possible to measure
private school tuition and the underlying quality of private schools . However, at this point we can only assume that
private schools did not make such an adjustment.

•

9
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•

In one case the governor appoints some, but not all of the officials. The remainder are elected.

In an alternative specification , we adjusted the size of the board of trustees for the population of the county. This
adjustment yields similar results to the ones reported in Table 3.
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Table 3

10

Trustee Size and Selection--The Impact on Private/Public School Enrollment

Dependent Variable: Ratio of private school to total enroll

Ordinary Least Squares Model
F Value

=

116.466 Prob > F

= 0 .0001

R2

=

.5488

Parameter
Estimate

ratio

Appointed Trustees Dummy

0.010442

3 .501

0 .0005

# of Trustees

-0 .000425

-0 .719

0.4726

Prob> /t i

and significant. The coefficient estimates on the two organizational variables, election versus
appointment and board size, are reported in Table 3. We find that the dummy variable capturing
the impact of appointed trustees is positively associated with private school enrollment. When
the public school trustees are appointed by the governor, parents tend to send their kids to private
schools, ceteris paribus. Secondly, we do not find any statistically credible relation between the
sizes of school boards and the private school enrollment ratio.

Why do these turn out this way? Two explanations come to mind. Elected trustees are
more closely controlled than appointed ones. When trustees are selected by the governor and
they do a poor job, it is more difficult for voters, taxpayers, and parents to influence the process
because they must work through and express their dissatisfaction through the governor's office.
Of course the same argument holds when the trustees do a good job. It is more costly to heap
praise as well. By contrast, when trustees are elected voters know who is responsible for the bad
and good choices; they are. Appointed trustees create higher agency costs because an extra layer
of decision making and control is involved. Lower quality output will, in general , be the result.
One reason that school board size is insignificant may be the presence of countervailing
effects. Larger boards may mean greater voter influence on the board, since each board member
is responsible to fewer voter/citizens/parents. Thus, large boards yield better quality public
schools. However, this effect could be offset by the fact that larger boards will almost surely
have higher costs of decision making.
We performed similar tests of model sensitivity that we reported earlier, attempting to
account for autocorrelation in the error terms and heteroscedasticity of errors. These alternative
specifications did not alter the basic conclusions suggested by Table 3.

Expenditures

•

•

As one might imagine, expenditures per pupil vary considerably across counties in the
state. Adjusting for the effect of inflation, we see that the annual per pupil expenditure in SC
has increased in real terms at about 5 % per year over the period 1957-1985 . Examine Figure
4. Real expenditures took big leaps in 1967, 1976, and 1982 . They fell substantially, more than
10%, only once, in 1977, which was probably due to the high rate of inflation in that year.
However, as the figure demonstrates, in recent years the trend of consistently increasing real

Vcnion of March 6, 1991

•

11

expenditures evident in the 1958-1975 period has not
persisted. In three of the most recent ten years, real
expenditures declined .
In some important respects the quality of
education and expenditures are jointly determined
along with the tax rates necessary to supply the
funds. To determine if this simultaneity situation is
affecting our single equation OLS results, we
reestimated the private school ratio equation jointly
with an expenditure and tax price equation using the
method of three-stage-least squares. This alternative
approach yields virtually the same results as the ones
reported in Table 2. 11 We interpret this to mean
that the question of tax prices is not driving the
relation between expenditures and quality that we
report.

Real ,: Chana:e in Expendllure• per Pupil
30 ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - ~

JO

20 f--'-L--t--'--'-1-----'--''-+--''---'-----,1-----'--''--r-''---'-----,--'-'-+-'---'-+-'--'--,
1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1962 198

Year

Figure 2 Real Changes in Expenditures
per Pupil

IV. Summary, Conclusions, and Suggestions
for Further Work

.

To say that education is an understudied area in the academy is an understatement. There '
is a surprising dearth of analysis into the organizational structure of secondary and higher
educational institutions. We have by no means corrected this oversight in our paper, but we hope
we have made a convincing argument that there is ample room for solid research in this area. ·
We have examined 30 years of county level data in South Carolina, and we have uncovered
several things. First, we found that there is no statistically credible relation between public
school expenditures per pupil and the private school/public school enrollment ratio. However
and importantly, we did find that the directed changes in rules , organizational structure, and
incentives, mandated by the 1984 Educational Improvement Act did reduce the relative number
of children attending private school. We interpret this to mean that the features of the law
requiring better accountability and the like were perceived by parents to make for better
education while the increased money spent was only a transfer to teachers or some other groups;
we find that organization matters more than money.
Along the way we developed a technique for gauging the quality of schools. The private
public school enrollment ratio is one metric of the relative quality of the two systems that policy
makers can use for introspection and evaluation. Second, we found evidence that counties with
multiple school districts have better public schools relative to the private peers. Third, according
to our estimates, counties with multiple, competing districts have better schools. That is, in
counties with more than one school district, fewer parents send their children to private schools.
This supports the view of thos·e who argue for more competition in the provision of public
education .

•
•

11
The exact model specifications and estimates are not reported here in the interests of brevity. They are available
from us.

Version of March 6, 1991

t

12

In all cases, much work remains to be accomplished. For instance, it is vital to know
whether the capital-labor components of spending vary across different school districts. Given
the sum of money currently being spent on education in this country, it is our belief that we can
ill afford to remain so incognizant of the role institutional and organizational forces play in the
production of schooling.
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